1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9		THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA OF LOS ANGELES
11	BARBRA STREISAND, an individual,	CASE NO. SC 077257
12	Plaintiff,	[Honorable Allan J. Goodman]
13	vs.	REPLY TO DEFENDANT KENNETH
14	KENNETH ADELMAN, an individual;	ADELMAN'S AND PICTOPIA.COM'S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF BARBRA
15	PICTOPIA.COM, a California corporation; LAYER42.NET, a California corporation;	STREISAND'S MOTION TO TAX COSTS
16	and DOE 1 through DOE 20, inclusive.	D
17	Defendants.	Date: April 30, 2004 Time: 8:30 a.m.
18		Dept.: H
19		Complaint filed: May 20, 2003
20		
21		
22		
23	·	
24		
25		
26		
27		
28		
ALSCHULER GROSSMAN		
STEIN & KAHAN LLP	REPLY TO DEFENDANTS' OPPOSITIO	ON TO STREISAND'S MOTION TO TAX COSTS

I. <u>INTRODUCTION</u>

Section 1033.5 of the California Code of Civil Procedure limits Defendants

Kenneth Adelman ("Adelman") and Pictopia.com (collectively, "Defendants") to only recovering those costs that are statutorily permitted and reasonably necessary to conduct the anti-SLAPP litigation. Defendants attempt to overextend the scope of the statute and force Plaintiff Barbra Streisand ("Streisand") to absorb costs that not only were not reasonably necessary to conduct the litigation but altogether failed to advance this action.

Accordingly, this Court should deny Defendants' improper requests for costs.

II. DISCUSSION

A. <u>Defendants Improperly Seek Costs for Exhibits and Exhibit Boards that</u> Were Not Reasonably Helpful to the Court

Defendants' claim for \$1,238.44 for the creation of three exhibits and copying and collating those exhibits is unreasonable. California Civil Procedure Code § 1033.5(a)(12) provides that a party may recover the cost of photocopies of "[m]odels and blowups of exhibits and photocopies of exhibits" when they are "reasonably helpful to aid the trier of fact." Defendants are expressly prohibited from recovering for the costs incurred as a result of photocopying exhibits that did not aid this Court. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1033.5(b)(2).

First, Defendants acknowledge that not all of the exhibits offered by Adelman were admitted into evidence. Defendants' Opposition to Streisand's Motion to Tax ("Opposition Motion"), at 1:28-2:2. Nevertheless, Defendants make no attempt whatsoever to discount that cost. Instead, and without justification, Defendants seek to make Streisand accountable for the cost of producing evidence that the Court could not, and did not, rely upon. Similarly, section 1033.5 only permits recovery of costs incurred for actual copying of exhibits. However, Defendants seek to charge Streisand for the cost of fasteners, tabs, custom tabs, and collating documents. None of these costs are provided for by the statute.

Furthermore, contrary to Defendants' assertion, the mere fact that <u>one</u> exhibit board may have been "helpful" to this Court, is not sufficient to justify an award of costs for either the so-called "helpful" board or for any other exhibit board for which Defendants seek

ALSCHULER GROSSMAN STEIN & KAHAN LLP compensation. Opposition Motion, at 1:25-26. Indeed, it is insufficient that an exhibit be merely helpful. Instead, the exhibits and photocopies must be "reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation rather than merely convenient or beneficial to its preparation." Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1033.5(c)(2); see also Heppler v. J.M. Peters Co., 73 Cal. App. 4th 1265, 1298 (1999). Defendants have not provided any evidence whatsoever to indicate that any of the exhibit boards were reasonably necessary for the conduct of this litigation, let alone that more than one of the boards might have been helpful to the trier of fact.

Defendants also mislead this Court in claiming that there is not any language in section 1033.5 prohibiting Defendants from recouping the costs incurred "in making a copy of exhibits for itself and the other parties for use at a court hearing." Opposition Motion, at 2:4-7. Indeed, California Civil Procedure Code § 1033.5(b)(2) expressly prohibits photocopying charges that are not for exhibits that aid the trier of fact. Clearly, the Court only needs one copy of any exhibit as additional copies certainly are not reasonably helpful to aid the trier of fact. As a result, the cost of photocopying exhibits for the <u>parties</u>, as opposed to exhibits for the Court, is not recoverable.

Likewise, Defendants do not make any attempt to apportion between photocopying, collating, and exhibit board preparation costs related to the preliminary injunction and the motion to strike. Having failed to allocate the cost of creating the materials for each motion—while also failing to establish that the photocopies and exhibit boards were reasonably necessary to this Court—Defendants have not provided any evidence to justify their request for costs for creating exhibit boards or for copying exhibits. Moreover, most of the color photocopying, especially those exhibits that were downloaded off of the Internet, could have been done on an in-house color photocopying machine. There, the only expense would be the cost of the paper.

Accordingly, Defendants should not be able to recover the costs of photocopying exhibits or creating exhibit boards.

1

2

3

4

5 6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23 24

25

26

///

111

111

27

28

Defendants incorrectly claim that use of messengers to deliver materials and file documents with the Court was both reasonably necessary to the litigation and reasonable in amount.

As an initial matter, messenger fees are not expressly authorized as costs by statute as this Court has discretion to determine whether it is appropriate to award those costs. Nelson v. Anderson, 72 Cal. App. 4th 111, 132 (1999). Second, contrary to Defendants' assertions, Defendants could have reasonably used U.S. mail, Federal Express, or personal filing when delivering documents to this Court. See Id. (holding that the trial court correctly determined that "messenger filings [were] of doubtful necessity and [were] unreasonable on their face, when compared to the probable cost of alternatives such as mail, Federal Express, or personal filing, in view of the size of the very large firm [Gibson, Dunn, & Crutcher] representing" the defendants). For example, Defendants bizarrely assert that "Federal Expressing the document would have cost the Defendants' counsel an entire day of time to prepare the filings." Opposition Motion, at 3:9-10. However, preparing a Federal Express air bill takes a matter of minutes and requires the same amount of time, if not less, than the time required to: (a) engage a courier, (b) provide the courier with filing and delivering instructions, and (c) monitor the courier to ensure that the task is completed. As a result, Defendants claim that it would have taken longer, let alone an "entire day," to Federal Express the documents is incomprehensible.

Lastly, since Defendants do not even itemize these expenses or attempt to describe how they arrived at this outrageous sum of \$1,395.80 for delivery of court filings and documents to the court, this Court has no basis to even determine whether the messenger services fees were reasonable. All evidence suggests, therefore, that the requested amount is grossly unreasonable and excessive.

III. <u>CONCLUSION</u>

Defendants overreach and seek more than they are entitled to and which they should not recover. Therefore, Streisand respectfully requests that the Court tax Defendants' costs as set forth herein.

DATED: April 23, 2004

ALSCHULER GROSSMAN STEIN & KAHAN LLP

JOHN M. GATTI REX D. GLENSY JONATHAME. STERN

John M. Gatti

Attorneys for Plaintiff BARBRA STREISAND

ALSCHULER GROSSMAN STEIN & KAHAN LLP -4-